

Christians and Muslims in the West: from isolation to shared citizenship?

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The geographical focus of this article is western Europe, the USA and those areas of Europe which were once part of the Ottoman empire with long established Muslim communities. The main emphasis will be western Europe which over a period of little more than forty years has become home to 13 million 'Muslims' – the most significant religious change since the Reformation.(1)

The USA where there are probably some 6 million Muslims provides a useful counterpoint to western Europe, since its Muslim communities tend to be better educated. Albania, Bulgaria and the successor states of Yugoslavia - along with small Muslim communities in Hungary, Poland and Rumania - comprise another 5.5 million Muslims.(2) These areas tend to fall largely within the Orthodox Christian world which have only recently emerged into the light of relative freedom after 70 years of communist oppression. For all these areas I use the shorthand the West.(3)

Muslims in the West

– the retrieval of history

There have been multiple interactions, military, commercial and intellectual between Islam and the West, as well as Muslims and Christians in the West for centuries. The Iberian peninsula which fell to Muslim armies in 718 could be characterised for much of its history, until its final reconquest with the fall of Granada in 1492, as a space of *convivencia*, the Spanish term for 'living side by side' of Christians, Muslims and Jews. While there was much intellectual and cultural exchange, we must avoid anachronism. This *convivencia* in medieval Spain, Sicily or the Crusader states was always 'tense, never relaxed...these were multicultural societies only in the severely limited sense that peoples of different culture shared the same territories'. (4)

As the Muslim hold on one part of Catholic Europe was weakening, at the same time in another, the Balkans, during the fourteenth century, it was being consolidated through Turkish conquest, at the expense largely of Orthodox Christianity. In 1453 Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire for over a millennium and seat of eastern Christianity, fell to the Ottomans. For almost five centuries the Balkan states and southeastern Europe were part of this vast empire. In the wake of conquest Muslim communities were established comprising Turkish speaking settlers, Muslims from across the Ottoman domains and many indigenous converts, especially in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Crete.

There are many unexpected episodes in what is slowly emerging as a new field of historic inquiry, namely Muslims in the West. A recent survey of Muslims in the USA can suggest that Spanish Muslim sailors acted as guides to the Spanish and Portuguese explorers; that thousands of Moriscos – Spaniards who secretly retained their Muslim identities after the 1492 – came to the Americas in

the 1500s and that as many as one fifth of all Africans brought in the slave trade were also Muslims.(5)

One recent study is a remarkable act of scholarly retrieval - *Islam in Britain: 1558-1685*.(6) Until this pioneer work, the intellectual, cultural and religious impact of the Ottoman Empire and its North African regencies on Britain, between the accession of Elizabeth 1 until the death of Charles 11, could be relegated to a footnote. In this study we learn of the fascination and fear inspired by the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul was the biggest city in Europe, the centre of a multi-ethnic empire, admired for its religious tolerance and offering unrivalled possibilities for social mobility to converts. The balance of military power was evident in the fact the British coastal towns were raided and shipping threatened almost with impunity by Turkish men-of-war.

In 1637 the Church of England established a process of penance and readmission for those who had converted to Islam while in captivity. In commercial and diplomatic treaties with the Ottomans, British monarchs had to concede that some of their subjects had converted to Islam and thus renounced allegiance to England. This was the context for references in contemporary drama and sermons to 'renegades'. Islam was even recruited as a rhetorical weapon in intra-Christian debates: a robust Ottoman religious Orthodoxy was commended by Anglican divines impatient of the acids of dissent; Islam's lack of a priesthood was commended by Puritans confronted by an oppressive Anglican hierarchy!

Particular debate surrounded the introduction in the mid-seventeenth century of the first coffee-house. Within a decade, the drinking of coffee had become so popular as to threaten...traditional ale! Known as the 'Mahometan berry' the debates around coffee touched on a range of issues, not least the question as to whether or not it enfeebled or heightened the sexual appetite. Was this a nefarious plot to undermine the fibre of Christian Englishmen?

A growing familiarity with the Muslim component in western history is of more than academic interest. It could begin to erode the notion that Islam is alien to the western intellectual and cultural tradition.

Demographic, economic and ethnic profile of the Muslim communities

The new Muslim presence in *western Europe* is the product of more recent history. Although there had been a trickle of Muslim migrants from India into Britain for three hundred years with the founding of the East India Company, substantial Muslim migration only begins in the late 1950s to the early 1970s to meet a growing labour shortage. Britain drew heavily on its ex-colonies, particularly Pakistan.

A similar pattern and chronology of migration can be traced for other ex-colonial powers. France looked to Algeria and Morocco. France and the Netherlands also drew on a further category of migrants, those Algerian and Moluccan soldiers who fought with the colonial armies and who also left with de-colonization. Germany turned to Turkey after the Berlin wall went up in 1961 and traditional sources of labour in South-West Europe had dried up.

A third stream of migrants tend to be refugees fleeing political oppression whether Palestinian, Algerian, Bosnian, Kosovar, Iranian, Iraqi, Afghan, Somali, Turkish Cypriots and Tunisian. Such an incomplete list indicates something of the scale of the turmoil and political crises inflicting so much of the Muslim world which has intensified in the last twenty five years. A fourth stream are better defined as sojourners, business people, students and diplomats.

While, the Muslim communities across western Europe are necessarily multi-ethnic, in many countries one national group tends to predominate and shape the public profile of Islam. This is clear if we consider the three largest Muslim communities in western Europe: France 4.5 million (7% of the total population), Germany 3 million (3%+), UK 1.6 million (3%-). In each country the public image of Islam tends to be shaped by Algerian, Turk and Pakistani respectively.

Such overall data gives little idea of the developing impact and visibility of Islam in western Europe. This presence is often confined to certain localities within a few major cities. In Belgium in 1989 there were about a quarter of a million Muslims or 2.5% of the population; however, in Brussels some 8% of the population was Muslim, of which 23 % of those under 20 were also Muslim.⁽⁷⁾ In 1991 a quarter of all Pakistanis in Britain lived in two cities, Birmingham and Bradford; with the small Bangladeshi communities they together represented 8 and 11 per cent of the population. In both cities they lived in a small number of inner city electoral wards: in Birmingham in 8 of 42 wards; in Bradford in 7 of 30 wards. By 2001 the Muslim communities had grown to 14 and 16 per cent respectively, or 75,000 and 140,000 respectively. In Birmingham 25 % of all children in schools are Muslim.

Most Muslims imported to do hard and often dirty jobs in labour intensive heavy industries were drawn from rural areas. The UK and Germany are typical in this regard: both drew on rural people who often came through a process of chain migration from certain villages in Azad Kashmir in Pakistan and Anatolia in Turkey. Most of those who came initially were men who intended to work for a few years then return home, to be replaced by a male relative. This 'myth of return' largely faded with the passage of restrictive immigration laws in the early 1960s in the UK and the early 1970s in France and the Netherlands.

The profile of Muslims in the USA and pattern of migration is somewhat different from western Europe. The first wave of migration came about 1875 and were largely unskilled and uneducated Arabs from what would now be described as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. The second wave followed in the 1920s and continued until World War II – this group were drawn from Africa and Eastern Europe. A third wave between the mid-40s and 1960s were often much better educated and had fled persecution: Palestinians, Egyptians and Iraqis. The final wave of migrants have come since 1967 when immigration laws were relaxed: this group are generally well educated, fluent in English and westernised.

A demographic study produced in 1991 reminds us that 30 per cent of Muslims in the USA are African American; another 28.4 per cent were from the Middle East/Africa – which category includes Turks and Iranians – 26.6 per cent were East Europeans; the remaining 11.5 per cent were from Asia – what in Britain we would describe as South Asia and South-East Asia. (8)

The Muslim experience in the Balkans is very different again. Here we are speaking of European communities which go back half a millennium. In Albania they comprise perhaps 70 per cent of the population. However, Albania was for long little more than a backwater of the Ottoman Empire. It

enjoyed a brief moment of national independence between 1912 and 1944 when the communists took over. The communist leader Enver Hoxa declared Albania the world's first officially atheist state in 1967 and his rule saw savage persecution of all religions. The Catholic Cathedral in the capital was used as a dance hall, the Orthodox Cathedral as a gymnasium. With the fall of communism the country regained its freedom in 1992. However, it remains the poorest country in Europe. In contrast, the Muslims of ex-Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were part of a sophisticated ruling class under the Ottomans. Tito was no Hoxa and religion was allowed, albeit in a sanitised form. In 1967 he recognised the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Muslim nation, one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia.(9)

A development cycle for Muslim communities in the West

We can broadly speak of the emergence of Muslim communities in the West moving typically through four phases. First, the pioneers; then 'chain migration' of generally unskilled male workers from a number of villages; followed by the migration of wives and children; finally, the emergence of a generation of Muslims born and educated in the West. Each phase, serves to enlarge the range of contacts and familiarity with western societies. During the second stage, the intention was for men to work for a few years and return to their country of origin, to be replaced by a relative who could continue sending remittances back. During this phase, the men often lived in multiple occupancy flats and houses; with the exception of the Algerians in France who spoke French and were already French citizens, most of the migrants elsewhere in western Europe, saw no need to develop a good knowledge of the language and culture of their neighbours, sustained as they were by the myth of return.

The third phase, is from reluctant sojourners to settlers. Reluctant, as we will see, since few had intended to leave their Muslim homelands for good, and there were few precedents within the Islamic tradition for Muslims choosing to leave the House of Islam – *Dar al Islam* – for the non-Muslim world, historically described as the House of War – *Dar al Harb*. During this third phase wives join their husbands or a bride was sought from the homeland. With family consolidation, a network of institutions was developed to meet the religious and cultural needs of their families. This typically involved establishing places to worship – initially, a Church might extend to them a use of a building, or a couple of houses or redundant commercial buildings would be acquired and converted into a mosque; then an imam would be sought, usually from the homeland, to teach the children the basics of Islam. During this third phase, Muslims had to develop the linguistic and social skills to interface with the municipal authority and key local institutions to make sure service provision was sensitive to their needs, whether in hospital, school or cemetery.

The third and fourth phase are, of course, overlapping. However, with the emergence of a generation of Muslims born and educated in the West, we see more Muslims being incorporated into public and civic society. There is an increase of Muslim councillors across Europe – for example, in 2001 some 200 in the UK, 130 in France and 120 in Belgium and Holland respectively; the emergence of an Islamic civil society, with associations of Muslim lawyers, teachers and doctors – this happened usually a generation later than in the USA with its critical mass of educated professionals; in centres of high Muslim settlement there is the consolidation of Muslim quarters with a whole range of goods and services provided by Muslim businessmen and professionals. In some countries there are a proliferation of private Muslim schools, as well as government funded

Muslim schools. There are experiments in establishing Islamic seminaries; in Rotterdam a pioneer Islamic University is created. In Brussels there is the emergence of Europe-wide Muslim legal and youth NGOs affiliated to the European Union.

All citizens are equal but some are more equal than others?

This four phase developmental cycle – from pioneer, sojourner, family consolidation to active citizen – is, of course, an ideal construct. Citizenship is a differential concept in the West and we need to explore the extent to which Muslims enjoy equal rights of citizenship. Also, such a schematised picture, does not allow for the strong continuing links between Muslims in the West and their countries of origin.

In the West, there have been three models developed for managing diversity

1. The “guestworker” model, where migrants are seen to have a temporary presence (Germany). Historically, German nationhood was vested in the *volk*, an ethnic community, and citizenship based on descent.
2. The assimilation model, where migrants are seen to be permanent but considered as individuals enjoying full citizenship rights but expected to assimilate into majority culture (France).
3. The ethnic minority model, in which institutional space for the preservation of cultural specificity is allowed for migrant communities, who also enjoy full citizenship rights (UK and USA).

The German model has been the least hospitable to extending citizenship rights to Muslims. The ethnic definition of citizenship, allied to the myth that Germany was not a country of immigration, inevitably left the millions of Turks in Germany in a sort of limbo. A situation that was congenial to the Turkish government, which wished to guarantee the continuing flow of remittances back to Turkey. This situation only changed with the new nationality law of 1999 which grants citizenship at birth to all children born in Germany, provided that at least one parent was born in Germany or arrived before the age of fourteen and holds a residence permit. Also dual citizenship would be tolerated, although not encouraged.

The French model of citizenship presupposes a strong centralised state which deals only with individual citizens. Other sorts of identification – regional, linguistic or religious – are tolerated so long as they do not impact in the public space, deemed to be Republican and secular. Thus Muslims in France can enjoy unimpeded citizenship rights. However, the price for such incorporation is to privatise religious commitment. Since Islam is a communal and public religion the struggle in France is over the extent to which the French state will allow such public expressions of Islam in the secular and public space. This, in part, was the reason for the 1989 crisis of the headscarf, where North African Muslim girls were not allowed to wear the *hijab* in the state school – the bearer of the Republican and secular ideology!

Historically, Muslims have found most ready acceptance for expression of their religious identity and full citizenship rights in the UK and the USA. In the USA religious pluralism is a constituent element of the nation's construction. Religious freedom is guaranteed and Muslims negotiate enactment of this principle on a state by state basis. Further, everyone in the USA is a minority and hyphenated identities – Italian American, Jewish American – are taken for granted. The UK granted citizenship to Commonwealth migrants legally entering the country. It also allows more spaces for Muslim self-expression than most other European countries: a state which comprises four nations, which has gradually made institutional space for denominational diversity since the Reformation, and which enjoys the relatively plastic category 'British' allowing some measure of multiple identities – British Jews – has gradually extended to Muslims the same rights enjoyed by other faiths. This model of making space for ethnic minorities also seems the way forward for mixed communities in the Balkans where religious and ethnic identity was suppressed for so long under communism.

Making space for Muslims in the West?

The incorporation of Muslims as equal citizens in the West is a necessary but not sufficient condition of acceptance. Here the related issue is the extent to which institutional space is accorded to religion in public life. The West embodies three broad models of relationship between state and religion – co-operation between state and religion; the existence of a state religion and the separation between state and religion.

In Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain all religions are officially recognized by law. The exact nature of this recognition varies: in Germany, notwithstanding the constitutional recognition of the principle of separation between state and religion and the state's neutrality in religious matters, the churches enjoy special rights as public corporations, thus giving legal authority to their social functions. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established the separation of between state and religions as well as guaranteeing religious freedom in 1980. However, Catholicism alone is cited in terms of cooperation between state and religion. While Islam has yet to enjoy the status of public incorporation in Germany – and with it the right to state funding of religious education in schools – the institutionalisation of Islam in Spain has occurred very quickly. A Spanish law in January 1992 gave official recognition to Islam via the Islamic Commission of Spain that groups together most of the country's Muslim associations. The agreement grants financial and legal benefits, recognizes religious marriages to be legally binding and introduces religious education in schools.

The existence of a state religion as in England, Denmark and Greece need not of itself disallow institutional space being made for Islam. This is clear from the English experience. Because public and civic life is permeated with Christian influence it is proving increasingly hospitable to the religious concerns of Muslims. Theology departments have been extended to include religious studies. All new religious education syllabi used in state schools have to reflect the social fact of religious diversity. Because the state funds religious schools which provide education for over 20 per cent of all children, this category has been extended since 1998 to include a handful of Muslim schools. Any religious group can found a private school. There are now more than 80 Islamic private schools. In September 1999 the Prison Service appointed the first Muslim Adviser and there are now a growing number of Muslim chaplains in prisons and hospitals. Public service broadcasting has always included explicit religious slots, which now include Muslim voices.

The formal separation of state and religion, where it is embedded in an ideological secularism, as in France, can discriminate against Islam. Here religion which strays into the public domain is considered a disturbance and aberration. However, where this separation is embedded in a society such as the USA where religious conviction is widely shared and functions as a kind of social cement – it can be included as a valued component of civil society, enjoying religious protection. In 2001 the Council on American Islamic Relations intervened in favour of a young Muslim woman, targeted by the French Embassy in Chicago for wearing a veil. Thanks to CAIR's role as mediator, the young woman was able to convince the French Consular authorities to allow her to have her passport photograph taken without removing her veil. The irony is that French Muslims have never succeeded in obtaining such an agreement while in France!

Muslims and identity politics in the West

Many political scientists have noticed that in our post Cold War world conflicts of class, ideology and political systems have gradually receded. In their place divisions based on group identities - cultural, ethnic and religious – have assumed a new significance. This has triggered a major debate in the West about how to accommodate religious and ethnic diversity. This is part of wider debate in political philosophy – especially in the USA and Britain – which has realised that liberal democracy and the market economy depend on values such as trust and mutual obligation, which they themselves cannot generate. On the political right this debate goes on under the name of communitarianism, and on the left, civil society. Both left and right realise that western society needs to attend to intermediate bodies not least religious bodies, which are schools of participative and deliberative democracy, as well as generators of trust, self-discipline and compassion.

The roots of contemporary identity politics are complex. Modern society has eroded social hierarchies, where status and 'honour' were relatively fixed, in favour of the rhetoric of equality and human 'dignity'. Democracies have ushered in what has usefully been dubbed 'the politics of recognition', whereby a diversity of groups, cultures and special interests now clamour for equal status and recognition of their identity. With this plea for public recognition goes a demand for resources and representation in policy-making.(10)

The politics of equal dignity can also pull in two distinct directions. One is a 'politics of universalism', which underpins anti-discrimination legislation in many countries. This insists that all citizens should have equal access to jobs, good housing and education and not be discriminated against on the basis of race and ethnicity. But when located within the context of modern notions of equal respect for identity and the communities which nourish these identities, the concern for equal dignity gives rise to a 'politics of difference', demanding that society and its laws give acknowledgement and status to something that is not universally shared.

The critical question is how to give public recognition to religious traditions without endorsing mutually exclusive visions of the good. One suggestion is that everyone should become 'bilingual': all must learn a public language of citizenship, while rooted in their respective secondary languages, cultivated in families, communities, associations. Religious traditions are understood as part of our 'moral ecology'. Various dangers are to be avoided:

1. If we recognise only the first public language, we in effect call for the disintegration of minorities.
2. If we recognise only secondary languages, we risk moving to a society of conflicting ghettos.
3. What is needed is a balance between the conflicting claims of the individual, the group and society as a whole.(11)

What is important is that the Muslim presence in the West has occurred at a time when western societies are hospitable to such debates. It has meant that integration of minorities does not have to inevitably mean what that term has denoted in France, namely assimilation. The creation of Muslim communities in the West has also given Muslims the freedom to express ethnic identities often suppressed in their countries of origin. Thus in France 'Algerian' actually encompasses large Berber communities; in Germany 'Turk' includes many Kurds; in Britain 'Pakistani' comprises a significant Kashmiri community. The freedom to express such ethnic identities can have curious expressions: Birmingham three local councillors were returned who represent a Kashmiri party!

The situation in the Balkans is different again. In the nineteenth century nationalism and Orthodoxy developed hand-in-hand and defined itself explicitly or implicitly over and against Islam and Muslim communities. The stance of the Serbian Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates the dangers of Orthodoxy legitimising ethnic and religious nationalism. Here church leader and monk alike had assimilated nineteenth century romantic nationalist myths about the defeat of Prince Lazar and circulated them afresh in the 1980s and 1990s. According to this version "the Serbian Prince Lazar, killed in the battle of Kosovo in 1389, [is depicted] as an explicit Christ figure, surrounded by disciples [his knights], betrayed by a Judas [a Serb convert to Islam], killed by Christ killers (Turks). And avenged by a hero...held up as a model for all Serbs." (12) Such myths were eagerly embroidered by Serbian nationalists and offered little space for creative co-existence with Muslims acknowledged as fellow citizens.

However, what is contested is the extent to which such antagonism to Muslims in the Balkans is intrinsic to aspects of Orthodoxy itself, or "to (a) a collective memory of domination by, and conflict with, the Ottoman Empire; (b) the Communist suppression of religious aspiration and identities; (c) political circumstances and manoeuvring by domestic and/or outside actors." (13)

A crisis in Muslim religious leadership in

the West?

Thus far, the emphasis has been on the willingness of Western societies to make space for Muslims, legally, institutionally and culturally. However, this begs the question of how Muslims themselves view their presence in the West. It is worth stressing the novelty of the situation in which many contemporary Muslims living as a minority in the West find themselves. The majority – whether from North Africa, Turkey, Pakistan or the Middle East – migrated from countries where Islam was the dominant religious and cultural reality. The Sunni majority belong to a religious tradition which in its classical development took power for granted.

Qur'anic, Islamic juristic and historical material traditionally generated four options for Muslims in non-Muslim societies: (1) struggle to incorporate non-Muslim societies into *Dar al-Islam* (the domain of Islam); (2) *hijra* – migration - to *Dar al-Islam*; (3) isolation from non-Muslims; (4) engage in a pact with the non-Muslim state to ensure the religious freedom to perform basic religious obligations. This last is the most promising model for Muslims in the West. Early Islamic history legitimised such an option, when the Prophet's followers fled persecution in Mecca and migrated to Abyssinia, a Christian country, between 615 and 622 AD.(14)

If Muslims are to successfully negotiate their insertion into western societies much will turn on the quality and confidence of their religious leadership to enable a discerning Islamic engagement with wider society. At the moment, it is no exaggeration to speak of a crisis in religious leadership across the West. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, many western societies have been content to leave the provision of many imams to sending societies e.g. the Turkish government has been allowed to fund and provide imams across western Europe to Turkish communities whether in Denmark, France, Germany or Holland.(15) They only stay for a few years and then are replaced. This inevitably slows down the emergence in western Europe of indigenous Islamic seminaries.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has funded many central mosques in capital cities across western Europe. Such funding means that key personnel in these mosques embody the Saudi tradition of Islam – *Salafi/Wahhabi*. Saudi Arabia was until the 1960s largely a closed society. The religious tradition developed from within such a closed society was literalist, puritanical and bitterly sectarian, inhospitable to other interpretations of Islam, especially the more open and accommodatory traditions of Sufism.(16)

Within the West because large numbers of Muslims came from rural areas, they imported imams familiar with their social and cultural world. Such imams, even when well educated in the traditional Islamic sciences, usually had no western language and no more than a cursory acquaintance with western culture. Most were quite incapable of connecting with a new generation of Muslims, streetwise, socialised and educated in the West.

Among Muslims educated in the West, some are attracted to the *Islamist* traditions. The *Islamists*, for whom Islam is a system or political ideology, emerged in 1920s and 1930s in India and in Egypt. In the West they are often creating an Islamic civil society sector - associations of Islamic lawyers, teachers and doctors. This is clear in France and in Britain.(17) In all, they are enabling just that pattern of engagement with wider society which is so necessary.

The radicalisation of Muslims in the West?

Throughout the 1990s many Muslims educated and socialised in the West have become more politicised and often angry. Bosnia and the continuing tragedy of Palestine are key moments in this process. The fact that European Muslims could be ethnically cleansed and savagely repressed, while European powers seemed content to remain on the sidelines or engage in ineffective interventions fuelled the notion that Europe continued to harbour an ancient hatred of Muslims.

The USA's support for Israel and seeming indifference to the suffering of the Palestinians created disillusionment with instruments of international relations such as the UN. Why, it was repeatedly asked, did the West move energetically against Iraq for non-compliance of UN resolutions but look the other way when Israel did the same? Such a suspicion of anti-Muslim sentiment has to be seen in the wider context of two wars against Iraq, the bloody repression in Algeria, interventions in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

The catalogue of suffering seemed endless with the West either directly involved or supporting authoritarian Muslim regimes. This was happening at a time when across Europe Muslims were able to access information produced within the West in vernacular languages by Muslims.(18) More and more Arabs in the West were watching media coverage produced by the television channel, Al-Jazeera, based in Qatar. Al-Jazeera and other Muslim media outlets meant that Muslims could supplement their access to CNN and the BBC with Arab and Muslim sources of information.

Within western Europe at the same time there were high profile episodes which did awaken fear of Islam, whether the Rushdie affair or the occasional bomb atrocity committed in France by Algerian extremist groups. Such events began to generate an anti-Muslim sentiment on which right-wing movements across western Europe began to capitalise. Thus, Jean-Marie Le Pen could gain 17 per cent of the votes in his presidential campaign in 2002. The fact that Pim Fortuyn's anti-Muslim campaign could take place in Holland, historically one of the most tolerant countries in western Europe, also raises legitimate worries. In Britain the British National Party have been able to win several seats in several northern cities after the riots of 2001.(19)

Muslims understandably worry about negative media reportage of Islam. Their fears are not unfounded. A recent study – *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* - drawing on extensive research over two decades, concluded that Hollywood had projected Arabs as villains in over 900 feature films; cumulatively such films degrade and dehumanise the image of the Arabs. "The vast majority of villains are notorious sheikhs...Egyptians and Palestinians...The rest are devious dark-complexioned baddies from other Arab countries...Missing from the vast majority of scenarios are images of ordinary Arab men, women and children, living ordinary lives. Movies fail to project exchanges between friends, social and family events." (20)

If Muslims are to feel at home in the West, their legitimate worries about aspects of western foreign policy and the depictions of Muslims, need to be heard and addressed. This was the burden of the Runnymede Trust report produced in London in 1997, *Islamophobia, a challenge for us all*. This does not mean ignoring extremist groups but does require a nuanced analysis of *Islamism*. A specialist on the Middle East noted that "the tendency of U.S. policymakers to vilify Islamists and to create an aggregate image of Arab and Muslim enemies has implications for domestic as well as international relations".(21)

Since the atrocities of 9/11 the danger is that Muslims will simply be seen as a security problem. Draconian legislation sends out worrying messages. In the USA the Homeland Security Act and USA Patriot Act include the registration of visitors to the U.S. drawn from a list of twenty Muslim or Arab countries. The British Anti-Terrorist Act 2001 allows imprisonment of those suspected of involvement in terrorist activities without trial for an indefinite period.

Muslim attitudes to Christians:

a hall of mirrors?

The preoccupation of Muslims in the West today is to establish themselves and their communities in a world which others have shaped at a time when Islam is often depicted as posing an essential threat to what their neighbours hold dear, whether democracy, religious freedom, human rights or gender equality. Muslims for their part respond by insisting that “only Islam offers and promotes a real moral and ethical alternative to permissiveness, consumerism, hedonism, moral relativism and individualism associated with and promoted by the modern Western cultures”.(22)

Muslims face a bewildering range of tasks, practical, intellectual and institutional. These range from creating appropriate organisations which can bridge the ethnic and sectarian divisions within the Muslim communities so as to relate to the state; addressing Islamophobia, identifying practical strategies to address the emergence of a Muslim underclass in many western cities; developing an Islamic jurisprudence – *fiqh* - appropriate for minority status; networking groups of Muslim professionals within the legal, medical, political and educational/university system, to organising Islamic aid to help Muslim groups across the world, suffering from oppression and natural disasters.

In such a situation, the frank supersessionism written into the Islamic tradition vis-à-vis Christianity, leaves little need or energy for ‘curiosity’ about ‘the otherness of the other’. (23)

Within self-consciously Islamic institutions and organisations in the West such a stance translates into one of four broad responses to Christianity. For most *‘ulama*, whether trained in or outside the West, Christianity is simply invisible, part of non-Muslim society often painted in lurid colours as irredeemably corrupt. Many imams embody a ‘separatist’ spirituality and warn their congregations against unnecessary interaction with “*mushrikun* and *kafirun* (‘polytheists’ and ‘unbelievers’)", categories in which Christians are subsumed. (24)

Institutions committed to *da’wa* [invitation to Islam] often draw on and develop a rich anti-Christian polemical tradition. (25) International bodies which promote *da’wa*, such as the Mecca based ‘Muslim World League’, properly seek to defend the rights of Muslim minorities in the West. However, once their rights have been secured in a given country, “the second phase of the League’s strategy is aimed at transforming the minority into a ruling majority through proselytization”. (26) Such a set of priorities leaves little space for genuine religious dialogue with Christians.

Radical Muslim groups have developed a rejectionist stance of all things western/Christian, for which the term ‘occidentalism’ has been coined. (27) Fortunately, this is not the whole story. As Muslims are born, educated and socialised in the West, are embedded in communities whose future is in West, generate a middle class, begin to be active in a range of professions including academia and journalism, so they join Muslim movements which can connect with wider society. Further, Muslim governments and transnational movements have no desire to be locked into some supposed clash of civilizations. There emerges an inchoate constituency willing to co-operate with Churches, especially in addressing pressing social issues. The events of 9/11 have underlined the urgency for Muslims in the West to build bridges with wider society, not least to counter a deepening Islamophobia. Such pragmatic engagement has the potential to generate a more informed and Islamically serious encounter with Christianity in its particularity and ‘otherness’.

Church responses at the international and

national level

At an international level there are two key moments. In 1964 the Catholic Church established the Secretariat for non-Christians – renamed the Pontifical Council for Inter-Religious Dialogue in 1989. This anticipated the positive teaching of the Vatican 11 declaration *Nostra Aetate* which urged Christians and Muslims “to strive sincerely for mutual understanding” and “to make common cause of safeguarding and fostering social justice, moral values, peace and freedom”. In 1971 the World Council of Churches WCC set up a Sub-Unit for Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies – in 1991 absorbed into the Office on Inter-Religious Relations.

Both institutions produced guidelines on inter-faith relations – including Islam – as well as hosting seminars and conferences with Muslims on a regular basis. Their publications have been translated into many languages and encouraged a range of national initiatives, as well as Europe-wide developments. Among the plethora of initiatives taken with the support of the Vatican and the WCC two might be mentioned. The first is the day of prayer for world peace organised by the Catholic lay movement Sant’Egidio (Saint Giles) on October 27, 1986, in Assisi, Italy. This was attended by Pope John Paul 11 and hundreds of religious leaders. Sant’Egidio, founded in Rome in 1968 to express Vatican 11’s commitment to ecumenical and interreligious dialogue and social concern, now has more than 18,000 members across the world. These commitments have further developed into a concern for peace making, not least in the Muslim world.

Illustrative of the concerns of the WCC are two Christian-Muslim colloquia convened by the Office on Interreligious Relations in 1992 and 1993. Fourteen scholars, evenly divided between Muslims and Christians, reflected on some of the most divisive issues in Christian-Muslim relations today e.g. the nature of Islamic law and the extent to which it can accommodate religious diversity and social change; how ‘secularism’ is viewed within Christian and Muslim traditions and divergent perceptions on the issue of human rights. The papers from these two colloquia have been published. An excellent introduction clarifies the fears and misconceptions both communities entertain about each other with regard to these issues. It is clear that Christian dialogue with Muslims on contentious issues, such as the *Shari’ah*, can only progress in the context of an awareness of intra-Muslim debate.(28)

The Vatican and WCC sponsored events remind us of a number of important developments in Christian reflection on Islam. First, since both faith traditions are international, issues cannot adequately be addressed at a national or even a regional level. Secondly, if Christian-Muslim dialogue is to engage the interest and imagination of more than a handful of activists it has to address contentious societal problems. As a previous chairman of the WCC Dialogue programme put it, Christian-Muslim dialogue “cannot be limited anymore to being nice to one another”; although, there is still a place, of course, for “overcoming misunderstandings, promoting mutual respect, exchanging experiences, looking for possibilities to cooperate”.(29) Thirdly, there is a place for long term trust building across key institutions. In consultations both the Vatican and WCC have developed relations with international Muslim bodies such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Muslim World League, as well as distinguished Muslim scholars.

Across the West, more and more national churches have designated individuals and committees to address Christian-Muslim relations, often drawing on personnel with missionary experience in the

Muslim world, and supported by a growing number of Christian institutions producing a range of scholarly and popular literature. Among European countries the French Catholic Church has the most developed relations with Muslims. In the early 1970s the Secretariat for Relations with Islam (SRI) was established in Paris. The Francophone world has generated high quality material produced by the Muslim-Christian Research Group (GRIC) which has been meeting for over twenty five years. One of its early works has been translated into English under the title, *The Challenge of the Scriptures, The Bible and the Qur'an*. (30)

The French Episcopal Conference of Bishops authorised in 1999 an exemplary and accessible set of pastoral guidelines for relations between Catholics and Muslims in France. These sought, *inter alia*: to confront the fear of Islamic extremism by contextualising the phenomenon and locating it as a small minority within a complex and varied field of Islamic expression; to engage young people in relationships across both communities; to encourage Catholics living side by side with Muslims in deprived areas to challenge the social exclusion of and contempt for Muslims. Such pastoral guidelines are fed through a network of contact priests who have responsibility for relations with Muslims and inter-religious relations in some 50 French dioceses.

Across Europe groups of specialists who resource the churches meet in a variety of forums. An informal network of Christians, the 'Arras group' – named after the French city where it first met in 1980 – drawing from more than ten European countries, meets annually to exchange news and discuss particular aspects of Christian-Muslim relations. There is often overlap between its membership and that Islam in Europe Committee of CEC (Conference of European Churches) and CCEE (Council of European Bishops' Conferences) formed in 1987. During its present five year mandate it has produced a variety of material: documents on the vexed issue of inter-religious prayer – "Christians and Muslims praying together?"; guidelines for dialogue – "Meeting Muslims?"; two letters addressed to the European churches sharing experiences around two issues, "The education of young Christians in a Pluralistic Europe" and "The role of Churches in a plural society". The committee has also promoted contacts with Muslims at a variety of conferences and venues including Tirana and Sarajevo.(31) A crucial issue which requires much more sustained theological reflection is the relationship in Christian terms between proclamation and dialogue, or in Islamic terms *da'wah* and dialogue.

Across the West such activities can draw on an ever increasing range of reliable publications – practical and academic: the oldest journal is *The Muslim World*, which started publication in 1911 in the USA; *Islamochristiana* an annual publication produced in Rome has been running for over a quarter of a century; *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* was started by the *Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* (CSIC) University of Birmingham sixteen years ago and is now jointly published with the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, Washington. CSIC has pioneered relations between Muslims and Christians since its foundation in 1976. Its particular strength is that from its inception it has been a genuinely collaborative venture involving Christians and Muslims at every level, teaching, organisation and students. In one sense it came of age last year with the appointment of its first Muslim director.

To complete this review of the range and scope of organisational responses to the new Muslim presence, it is worth mentioning the increasing interest of governments in enabling a serious dialogue. In Austria the Foreign Minister Dr Alois Mock in 1993 and his successor Dr Wolfgang Schüssel in 1997 convened through the agency of the Institute for Theology of Religions St Gabriel – a religious community near Vienna - two outstanding international Christian-Islamic conferences

drawing on religious leaders, scholars and politicians from across the world. The transactions of both conferences have been published in German and English and provide a wealth of serious reflection and deserve to be better known. The first was entitled “Peace for Humanity, Principles, Problems and Perspectives of the Future as Seen by Muslims and Christians”; the second “One World for All, Foundations of a Socio-Political and Cultural Pluralism from Christian and Muslim Perspectives”. One particularly valuable feature of both publications is the inclusion of the frank discussion which followed key note addresses

In January 2002 the British Prime Minister opened an international seminar involving twenty Christian and Muslim scholars hosted by the Archbishop of Canterbury at Lambeth Palace with the co-operation of Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan. The seminar papers with discussion were also published. (32)

Can the churches act as an antidote to religious nationalism?

Religious nationalism is a phenomenon sweeping the globe and is not peculiar to the Abrahamic religions.(33) It was touched upon earlier in its Serbian Orthodox dress. However, it is not confined to the Balkans. An imagined ‘Christianity’ is increasingly recruited by a resurgent political far right across western Europe as part of its anti-Muslim rhetoric. Their appeal has to be situated within a context of rapid social and cultural change - wrought by globalisation, with its attendant economic insecurity –at a time when with the nation state has been weakened by supranational and subnational regional politics, and therefore, is often less able to deliver generous social welfare provision. In this situation, the stranger is often scapegoated, amongst whom the most visible tend to be Muslims.

This is clear in Scandinavia. The Danes, for example, have had little experience of religious and cultural diversity. 85 per cent belong to the national Lutheran Church, although only a small percentage worship regularly. Initially, at a time of full employment, immigrant labour was welcomed in the 1960s to enable economic growth. However, when the economic situation began to change in the 1970s immigrants began to be seen as economic competitors with the native Danish labour force. Moreover, as the Muslim presence increased – in 2000 some 150,000 or 2.7 per cent – and became more visible, religious, ethnic and cultural otherness began to be problematised. This went hand in hand with increasingly negative media portrayals of Islam.

In this situation, politicians began to speak about Danish ‘Christian culture’ threatened by Muslim ‘culture’. Culture became a portmanteau term to explain the problems Muslims had in integrating. This was a more congenial explanation than asking whether Danish society was structured in such a way as to discriminate, exclude and marginalize Muslims. (34) In the process, Islam and culture were essentialised as fixed, and unchanging entities.(35).

Fortunately, the churches have begun to respond to such challenges. Copenhagen has an innovative Islamic-Christian Study Centre involving Christians and Muslims set up in the mid-1990s. (36) Recently the national church established a new forum for religious encounter with 7 of the 10 dioceses supporting it. Central to its programme is dialogue with Muslims. Such encounter will, it is

hoped, challenge myths about Muslims in the country, since over 80 per cent of Danes never meet a Muslim, given their concentration in a few urban areas.

The Danish situation simply focuses a number of issues facing the churches at large. Can they use their institutional influence to facilitate a conversation between the media and Danish Muslims to enable a more nuanced representation of Islam and Muslim diversity to become visible and audible? Can religious education reflect the historic importance of Christianity, yet make space for the study of Islam? Can European history be studied to include the Muslim presence and contribution in Spain and the Balkans?

Faith in the City?

A review of the new Muslim presence in the West suggests in many places the gradual incorporation of Muslims in public and civic life with the emergence of a middle class. At the same time, there is the emergence of a Muslim underclass in many cities. The number of Muslims in prison has increased quite dramatically in the last decade in a number of European countries. Most dramatically, in France, where Muslims make up more than half of the male prison population. (37)

The issue of an emerging Muslim underclass in western European cities, mirroring the same reality among a section of the indigenous working class, and African-American Muslims in the USA, poses one of the sharpest challenges to the development of creative co-existence. Deprived communities are the most likely to look to the newcomer to blame. Muslim communities have grown exponentially in the last two decades, because they are predominantly young communities with aggregate family size considerably larger than the host community – although this changes across generations. Further, because Muslim settlement is heavily concentrated in a few cities and usually within Muslim quarters, many Muslims can live within an ethnic enclave; whether Turks in Berlin, Algerians in Lyons, Moroccans in Utrecht, Pakistanis in Bradford.

Often these same cities have experienced dramatic de-industrialisation with the collapse of those labour intensive heavy industries for which labour was imported in the 1960s and 1970s. This means that many elderly Muslims who lost their jobs are often unemployable, lacking the requisite linguistic and social skills. Thus, there is minimal interaction at work. Among their sons, educational underachievement and poor job prospects translates predictably into an escalating cycle of anti-social behaviour and crime.(38) This, then, reinforces Islamophobic sentiment in the wider society, although the causes have very little to do with Islam.(39)

Churches in these cities face the new challenge of sustaining a relevant presence in these Muslim quarters. If they pull out, then Muslims will be further encapsulated. Also, a key issue is the extent to which imams are being educated to connect confidently with their own young people and wider society. Here, there are some promising developments. Across western Europe, there is a professionalisation or clericalisation of imams, as they move into spaces historically reserved for Christian clergy; chaplaincy in hospitals and prisons, as well as become religious education teachers, whether in Holland and Britain. Here they are often collaborating with clergy and developing new social and intellectual skills. Such developments are vital for the health of European cities. At the moment, clergy who approach the imam in the mosque, usually find people

ill equipped, linguistically or intellectually, to relate to them. This poses a massive barrier to developing healthy inter-religious co-operation.

Clearly, the greatest challenge facing Muslims and Christians is to learn to share public and civic space, and seek together to shape it for the common good, a category familiar to Islamic jurisprudence. In so far as they are successful, they will generate valuable lessons for other parts of the world, where Christian-Muslim relations are often very tense. There are some encouraging signs in this regard. A recent consultation was held by Muslims in Britain and its deliberations published under the title, *British Muslims, Loyalty and Belonging*.⁽⁴⁰⁾ What was impressive was that Muslims from different traditions of Islam were invited to deliver papers; many were academics embedded in British academia. Christians and non-Muslim academics were also invited to participate. The discussions following the papers indicated real debate and self-criticism. In the past, inter-religious dialogue was largely a Christian initiative. Here we have Muslims taking the initiative and inviting Christians. This augurs well for the future.

Footnotes

1. I put the term 'Muslim' in inverted commas to leave open what exactly we mean by such a term. For some their Muslimness is mainly cultural, for others it encompasses a minimal involvement in religious rituals, then for others it involves religious commitment which can take diverse expressions – mystic, missionary or militant – and for others it is little more than an attribute of ethnic identity.

2. I have drawn such figures from two useful sources Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach (eds) 1997 *Islam in Europe, the politics of religion and community*, Macmillan Press, London and Brigitte Marechal (ed) 2002 *A Guidebook on Islam and Muslims in the Wide Contemporary Europe* [French and English], Bruylant-Academia, Louvain-La-Neuve.

3. The West could be used as a cultural entity to encompass Muslims in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Caribbean – as in a recent collection of essays edited by Y.Y Haddad & J.I. Smith, 2002, *Muslim Minorities in the West, Visible and Invisible*, Altamira Press, Oxford.

4. Richard Fletcher, 2003, *The Cross and the Crescent, Christianity and Islam from Muhammad to the Reformation*, Allen Lane, London, p 116. Carole Hillenbrand, 1999, Edinburgh University Press, *The Crusades Islamic Perspectives* includes a brilliant chapter revealingly entitled, "How the Muslims saw the Franks: ethnic and religious stereotypes".

5. See Y.Y.Haddad and J.I.Smith 1995, "United States of America", *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, Oxford University Press, vol 4.

6. See Nabil Matar, 1998, *Islam in Britain, 1558-1685*, Cambridge University Press.

7 See Gerd Nonneman, Tim Niblock and Bogdan Szajkowski (eds) 1996 *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, Ithaca Press, Reading.

8. See Carol L Stone, "Estimate of Muslims Living in America", in Y.Y Haddad, (ed) 1991 *The Muslims of America*, Oxford University Press. For more recent studies of Muslims in USA see Y.Y. Haddad (ed) 2002, *Muslims in the West, From Sojourners to Citizens*, Oxford University Press.
9. See Nonneman, *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, above, for a selection of essays on the Balkans and eastern Europe.
10. See especially the classic text, Charles Taylor, 1992 *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"*, Princeton University Press.
11. See Jonathan Sacks 2002 *The Dignity of Difference*, Continuum, London, for a fine exploration of these issues.
12. Michael A Sells, "Serbian Religious Nationalism, Christoslavism, and The Genocide in Bosnia, 1992-1995", Paul Motzes (ed) 1998, *Religion and The War in Bosnia*, The American Academy of Religion, Scholars Press, Atlanta p. 198.
- 13.. G. Nonneman (ed) 1996 *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, Ithaca Press, Rading, p 17.
14. See M.K. Masud, 1989, 'Being Muslim in a Non-Muslim Polity: Three alternative Models' *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 10: 118-28.
15. See Lars Pederson, 1999 *Newer Islamic Movements in Western Europe*, , Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England and USA.
16. See Anne Sofie Roald, 2001, *Women in Islam, The Western Experience*, Routledge, London. Roald, a Norwegian convert to Islam, offers a fascinating window into Arab Islamists across western Europe and provides an illuminating insight into the nature of the *Salafi* tradition. The sectarian struggle between Salafi and Sufi is accessibly covered in E. Sirriyeh, 1999, *Sufis and Anti-Sufis, the defence, rethinking and rejection of Sufism in the modern world*, Curzon, Surrey.
17. For France see Jocelyne Cesari, "Muslim Minorities in Europe: the Silent Revolution", in John L Esposito and Francois Burgat, 2003, *Modernizing Islam, Religion in the public sphere in Europe and the Middle East*, Hurst, London; for Britain, see the postscript to P. Lewis, 2002, *Islamic Britain, Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims*, I.B.Tauris, London.
18. Typical of the emerging Muslim media output was the Muslim English monthly, Q-News, which targeted the growing pool of British Muslim professionals.
19. EUMC, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, in Vienna, produced a useful report in May 2002, *Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001* see information@eumc.eu.int and <http://eumc.eu.int>
20. Jack G. Shaheen, 2001, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*, Northampton, New York, p. 13. See also, Eizabeth Poole, 2002, *Reporting Islam, media representations of British Muslims*, I.B.Tauris, London.

21. Mamoun Fandy “Interface between Community and State: U.S. Policy toward the Islamists”, Y.Y Haddad, 2002, *Muslims in the West, From Sojourners to Citizens*, Oxford University Press, Oxford. P. 209. To understand the manifold ways in which the relationship between politics and religion are understood within Islamic history, as well as the reasons for extremist expressions within political Islam the following texts are useful: Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, 1996, *Muslim Politics*, Princeton University Press, John L. Esposito, 2002, *Unholy War, Terror in the Name of Islam*, Oxford University Press, Gilles Kepel, 2002, *Jihad, the trail of political Islam*, I.B.Tauris, London and Francois Burgat, 2003, *Face to face with Political Islam*, I.B.Tauris, London.
22. Riaz Hassan, 2002, *Faithlines, Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, p 209.
23. A. Siddiqui, 1997, *Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the Twentieth Century*, Macmillan, London, p. 196.
24. Karel Steenbrink, “The Small Talk of Muslims and Christians in the Netherlands”, 2000, Jacques Waardenburg (ed) *Muslim-Christian Perceptions of Dialogue Today, Experiences and Expectations*, Peters, Leuven. P 206.
25. See P.Lewis, “Depictions of Christianity within British Islamic institutions”, Lloyd Ridgeon (ed) 2001 *Islamic Interpretations of Christianity*, Curzon Press, Surrey.
26. B. F. Breiner and C.W. Troll, “Christianity and Islam”, J. Esposito, 1995, *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 1 p 284.
27. A. Ahmed, 1992, and *Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament Promise*, Routledge, London, p 177.
28. For the role of Sant’Egidio see R. Scott Appleby, 2000, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred, Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, Rowman & Littlefield, Oxford, pp 155-165. For the WCC colloquia see Tarek Mitri (ed) 1995, *Religion, Law and Society, A Christian-Muslim Discussion*. WCC Publications, Geneva.
29. Dick Mulder, “Developments in dialogue with Muslims: World Council of Churches”, Ge Speelman, Jan van Lin and Dick Mulder (eds) 1995, *Muslims and Christians in Europe, Breaking New Ground, essays in honour of Jan Slomp*, Kok, Kampen, p. 160.
30. *The Challenge of the Scriptures*, 1989, Orbis, New York. The continuing work of the group and the challenges it faces is addressed in chapter six of J. Waardenburg, *Muslim-Christian Perceptions of Dialogue Today*.
31. Much of this material is available on the internet www.cec-kek.org Speelman and Mulder’s volume is a festschrift to Jan Slomp, the first chairman of the ‘Islam in Europe Committee’ and contains useful material about the committee. For European developments also worth consulting is Penelope Johnstone and Jan Slomp, “Islam and the Churches in Europe: A Christian Perspective”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 1998, vol 18:2, 355-363. For a comprehensive tour d’horizon of the range of recent Christian-Muslim activities see the concluding chapter –Dialogue or

Confrontation – in H. Goddard 2000 *A History of Christian-Muslim Relations*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

32 For the Austrian conferences see Andreas Bsteh (ed) 1996, *Peace for Humanity*, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi; Andreas Bsteh (ed) 1999 *One World for All*, Vikas publishing House, New Delhi – publishers contact: chawlap@viasd101.vsnl.net.in and www.ubspd.com and for the Lambeth papers see

Michael Ipgrave (ed) *The Road Ahead*, 2002, Church House, London.

33. See Mark Juergensmeyer, 1993, *The New Cold War? Religious nationalism confronts the secular state*, University of California Press, London.

34. For Denmark see the comments of Lars Pedersen, 1999, *Newer Islamic Movements in Western Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 156-7.

35.. See Gerd Baumann, 1996, *Contesting Culture, discourses of identity in multi-ethnic London*. A brilliant study of the social and cultural interactions of English, Afro-Caribbean, Irish, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims in Southall, indicating the plastic nature of 'culture'.

36. I owe much of the information in this section to frequent email conversations with Rev. Dr Lissi Rasmussen, the Director of the Islamic-Christian Study Centre, Copenhagen.

37. This startling statistic was included in Dr Farhad Khosrokhavar's paper on Muslims in French Prisons, delivered as a recent conference in London and reported in the February 2003 edition of *Dialogue*, produced by the Public Affairs Committee for Shi'a Muslims, Stone Hall, Chevening Road, London NW6 6TN.

38. In Britain, boys do less well than girls in education. The gap between boys and girls of Pakistani heritage is the widest of all groups.

39. In Britain, in seeking to understand the complex reasons for educational underachievement of sections of Pakistani young men, two reasons among a complex of factors have been identified as touching on religion and culture. Many of these youngsters spend two hours a day, six days a week, for six to eight years, from 6 years old, in mosque schools after state school. Here they often learn the Qur'an by rote in Arabic without understanding it. Their teachers, imams often trained in Pakistan, often have few pedagogical skills. This can leave them tired and with little time for school home work. The second factor has more to do with patriarchal rural culture. Within a city such as Bradford, over fifty per cent of arranged marriages are still conducted with rural Kashmir.

40. M. S Seddon, D, Hussain and N. Malik, 2003, *British Muslims Loyalty and Belonging*, The Islamic Foundation, Markfield.